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Abstract 
The United States and closely allied institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have 
played an active part in promoting neoliberal reform in Southeast Asia. This paper 
examines resistance to such reform in the region, particularly at the ‘grass roots’ or non-
elite level, and considers the possible implications such forces may have for wider, inter-
regional relations. I argue that the promotion of neoliberalism in particular, and America’s 
regional role more generally, were always contentious issues, even when such debates were 
confined to a narrowly defined economic sphere.  In the aftermath of September 11th, 
however, when Southeast Asia has again become part of wider geo-political contestation, 
the complex and potentially divisive nature of America’s engagement with Southeast Asia 
may create new tensions within the region as it struggles to accommodate the strategic and 
political-economic dimensions of American hegemony. 
 
 
Even before the Second World War concluded it was clear the United States was not 
simply massively powerful, but that its actions would profoundly affect the rest of the 
world. There is, perhaps, nothing remarkable about this: the strong have always done 
what they will, and the weak have always acted as they must. What is striking about 
American power in the post-war period, however, is that it was utilized quite self-
consciously to create a particular form of international order that – arguably – 
transcended the United States’ own, narrowly conceived national interest. Despite the 
extensive criticism that the so-called Bretton Woods institutions in particular and 
American hegemony more generally may have subsequently received, for the first 
couple of decades of the post-war period, the international order that emerged under 
American auspices was both successful, stable and enjoyed widespread support – 
amongst the US’s allies in the ‘free world’, at least. 
 
A number of recent events have fundamentally transformed the nature of American 
hegemony and the context within which it unfolds. Most immediately, the events of 
September 11 have brought about a major change in US foreign policy as America’s 
political elites attempt to come to terms with new strategic realities. The attacks on 
America would have profoundly influenced American foreign policy whoever was 
president, but the current administration of George W. Bush has been especially 
assertive and willing to use American power to achieve political and strategic ends. 
And yet it is important to realize that a more generalized transformation in American 
foreign policy priorities had been underway for more than a decade: the pivotal event 
in the postwar period was not the recent attacks on America and the subsequent ‘war 
on terror’, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and the effective creation of what has 
now come to be described as an America-centric, ‘unipolar’ international order 
(Matsanundo 1997). The new environment, in which the US has neither strategic nor 
ideological  challengers,  has allowed the current administration to pursue ‘American 
interests’ free of the constraints of the Cold War era. In such circumstances, erstwhile 
allies and client states alike have found their room for maneuver increasingly 
circumscribed and their autonomy constrained. 
 
In Southeast Asia the impact of evolving American hegemony has been profound and 
generated complex effects. Parts of the region clearly benefited from the US’s more 
benign – toward its allies, at least – Cold War policies, which were instrumental in 
underpinning the region’s economic development. Of late, however, a more assertive, 
domestically driven and increasingly unilateral approach to foreign policy has 
generated a ground swell of opposition and anti-Americanism in parts of Southeast 
Asia, and raised awkward policy dilemmas for the region’s political elites as a 
consequence. The intention of this essay is to consider the impact of the US’s 
evolving strategic and economic priorities on the region. Consequently, I initially map 
the changing nature of American hegemony in the postwar period, before considering 
how this has affected Southeast Asia at both an elite level and amongst the 
populations of the region more generally. As we shall, the contradictory impact of 
American power is amplifying underlying tensions both within the region itself and 
between the region and the US. 
 
The evolution of American hegemony 
 
Describing  the US as ‘hegemonic’ has become surprisingly commonplace given the 
term’s association with Marxist scholarship generally and the ideas of Antonio 
Gramsci in particular. The reason it has been taken up by a wider audience is, of 
course, that it captures something distinctive about the contemporary nature of 
American power. As many observers have pointed out, we need to go back to 
Imperial Rome to find a comparative example of one country’s dominance over its 
rivals. But even ancient Rome could not claim the extent of the multidimensional 
power that the US currently enjoys. Whether it is measured by political influence, 
economic weight, cultural attractiveness or by the US’s unparalleled military 
advantages, the US dominates the rest of the world in an unprecedented way (Emmott 
2002).1 
 
Although, the notion of hegemony has been taken up by ‘realist’ scholars like 
Mearsheimer (2001), in their hands it loses much of its originality and is reduced to a 
measure of the relative power of unitary states. If ‘hegemony’ is not to go the way of 
other terms like ‘globalization’, which have enjoyed widespread and often 
indiscriminate usage (and lost much of their analytical purchase as a consequence), it 
is important to be clear about its meaning. For the purposes of this essay hegemony 
will be used to describe and conceptualize evolving social relationships, political 
practices and economic structures in a manner that is broadly sympathetic to the 
Gramscian-inspired tradition, which is sensitive to the trans- and sub-national 
dimensions of specific hegemonic orders and their capacity to reconfigure domestic 
and international social relations. 
 
Critical theories of hegemony 
 
                                                 
1 It should be noted, however, that despite the US having  by far the largest economy in the world, there 
are continuing doubts about the strength of its economy, partly as a consequence of domestic 
shortcoming and excesses, and partly because of its concomitant reliance on continuing inflows of 
foreign capital. See Brenner (2000). 
Unsurprisingly, because critical theories of hegemony have Marxist antecedents, the 
possible links between economic structural change and the concomitant 
transformations in class relations they may be associated with is a primary focus of 
attention. What is distinctive about Gramscian derived conceptions of hegemony, 
however, is a focus on the ideological components of class-based rule and their place 
in what is, of course, taken to be a fundamentally inequitable and exploitative 
capitalist system. The question of ‘ideology’ is a notoriously contentious one in 
Marxist scholarship (see Thompson 1984), as is the status of class analysis more 
generally (Hindess 1987), but it is not necessary to become immersed in, or paralysed 
by, such frequently involuted debates to recognise that for a particular international 
order to function successfully it needs a degree of legitimacy – if only to reduce 
‘transaction costs’ for the increasingly transnational economic interactions that 
characterise the contemporary global economy. In this context, the possibility of 
resistance – at either an elite or a societal level - to broadly conceived American 
hegemony becomes especially significant. 
 
Robert Cox has provided one of the must influential, persuasive and complete 
statements of a Gramscian-inspired  analyses of hegemony.2 Cox’s work has been 
subjected to extensive review elsewhere, and many of his ideas and those of his 
followers are by now sufficiently well known to need little repetition here (see, for 
example, Germain and Kenny 1998). There are, however, a number of aspects of the 
Coxian/Gramscian approach that merit emphasis as they help to explain both the 
position of the Southeast Asian region as part of the overarching international political 
economy, and the transformation of Southeast Asian societies that has accompanied 
it.  
 
Central to critical theories of hegemony is the idea that there is a complex, dialectical 
interaction between ‘objective’ material structures and the ‘subjective’ way such 
forces are mediated and understood by human beings, either as classes or individuals 
(Cox 1983). The interaction of structure and agency within a particular era crystallises 
in a specific ‘historic bloc’. An historic bloc is composed of a dominant class and a 
powerful set of ideas or ideology that – crucially – reflects the interests of the interests 
of the most powerful class. The interplay of structure and agency that shapes a 
particular historic bloc is manifest in a distinctive array of institutions, which are 
themselves shaped by contingent levels of economic development, social relations 
and political practice (Cox 19997: 29). Although ‘institution’ is another contested 
concept and its utilisation is consequently not as precise as we may like (see Beeson 
2002), it does provide another potentially vital element in any attempt to explain the 
precise and highly distinctive evolution of political, social and economic change in 
Southeast Asia within the overarching context of American hegemony. If American 
hegemony – or, more precisely, the dominance of a ‘transnational managerial class’ 
Cox 1997: 359-60), primarily centred in the US – is to achieve a more pervasive 
influence over Southeast Asian social formations and economic structures, then the 
key ideas associated with American interests must become part of the internalised, 
legitimated and institutionalised part of subjective reality throughout Southeast Asia. 
 
At one level this process might seem to have a certain inevitability. A number of 
recent analyses have persuasively argued that as the structures of global production 
                                                 
2 The key work is Production, Power and World Order. See Cox (1987). 
have become more integrated and transnational, there has been a concomitant, partly 
functional, consolidation of a distinct group of transnational policymakers, corporate 
executives and sympathetic intellectuals that has assumed a greater role in managing, 
and providing a legitimating rationale for, the current international political economy 
(Sklair 2001; Robinson and Harris 2000). Yet this ‘nascent global historic bloc’ (Cox 
1999: 12) is plainly not omnipotent, nor is its authority uncontested. At the same time 
that elite level relations have become increasingly transnational and inter-connected, 
there has been a simultaneous political mobilisation at a level ‘below’ the state, one 
that frequently transcends national borders in ways that lead some observers to claim 
that a ‘global civil society’ is emerging (Lipshutz 1992). Although much of this 
literature is by turns Panglossian and tendentious, and frequently fails to pay 
sufficient heed to the vast differences between civil society structures in the ‘North’ 
and ‘South’ (Clark et al 1998), the frequently non-progressive nature of NGO politics 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000), or the role that civil society may play in actually maintaining 
hegemony (Robinson 1996), it does alert us to the reality of potential sources 
opposition to American hegemony. Before considering this possibility in any detail, it 
is useful to consider the way American hegemony has evolved and affected Southeast 
Asia, as it has changed in important ways that will inevitably influence development 
within the region and between the region and the US itself. 
 
The changing face of American hegemony 
 
While it may now be uncontroversial to describe the US as hegemonic and recognise 
its dominant place in the international system, as we have seen, the precise nature of 
this domination remains open to interpretation. Not only is analysis inevitably 
coloured by the observer’s own prejudices and methodological assumptions, but the 
content of, and context within which hegemonic power has operated has changed 
profoundly in the post-war period. This evolution in the nature of American power is 
a crucial, but relatively neglected aspect of the contemporary international order; it is, 
however, one that impacts directly on less powerful countries like those of Southeast 
Asia. The principal difference between American power now and the operation of US 
hegemony in the aftermath of World War 2 is that it has become less consensual and 
more coercive. Simultaneously – especially, but not exclusively, since September 11 – 
American foreign policy has become increasingly unilateral and less constrained by 
either its allies or multilateral institutions. To appreciate the significance and 
implications of this transformation, it is necessary to say something about the earlier 
phase of American hegemonic influence. 
 
The key difference in the geopolitical environment in which America played such a 
crucial part in the war’s aftermath was, of course, the Cold War - a confrontation that 
unambiguously structured relations between the superpowers and their respective 
allies. Although this period was characterised by intense ideological rivalry, 
paradoxically enough it provided an opportunity for allies and client states to prosper 
beneath the US’s benign strategic umbrella. For those East Asian countries fortunate 
enough not to be on the ‘wrong’ side of the ideological divide as far as the US was 
concerned, American hegemony held out the beguiling prospect of cut-price defence, 
critical aid and investment flows, and a willingness to tolerate political and economic 
practices of which the US might not have approved, were American policymakers not 
so keen to propagate any sort of successful capitalist economy (Beeson and Berger 
2003).  
 
It is not necessary to agree with Kunz’s (1997: 54) depiction of post-war initiatives 
like the Marshall Plan as providing ‘an idealism previously lacking in American 
foreign policy’, to recognise that, altruistic or not, contemporary American foreign 
policy now looks and ‘feels’ very different for those on the receiving end. In the 
aftermath of World War 2, by contrast, the US was instrumental in creating an ‘open’, 
liberal international order distinguished by an array of new international financial 
institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Latham 1997). Crucially, and despite the fact that the US was the dominant power in 
the design and subsequent operation of the IFIs, it was an international institutional 
order that - to some extent at least – constrained the US itself (Ikenberry 2001). As the 
recent East Asian crisis revealed, not only has the US displayed an increased 
willingness to use the IFIs in ways that suit its own perceived interests, but American 
foreign policy is less constrained by multilateral institutions and agreements more 
generally (Beeson 2003a). Even more tellingly, America’s self-declared ‘war on 
terror’ has provided an even more direct and intrusive challenge for other countries, 
especially those perceived to have links to terrorist organisations. 
 
The important point to emphasise from this highly truncated discussion of evolving 
American hegemony is that, freed from the constraints of geopolitical competition and 
rivalry, US policymakers are more prepared to use American power to pursue - 
unilaterally, if necessary - more narrowly conceived ‘national interests’. This process 
was arguably already well-entrenched even under the Clinton administration: when 
geo-economics appeared to have permanently trumped geo-economics, American 
power was systematically applied to economic partners an effort to address America’s 
perennial trade deficits (see, for example, Schoppa 1997). Under the administration of 
George W. Bush, when strategic issues have reasserted themselves, and where there is 
an administration that is quite prepared to use the US’s overwhelming strategic 
superiority in an attempt to impose its preferred international vision, the implications 
for the rest of the world at both the national and regional levels are profound. 
 
American hegemony and Southeast Asia 
 
The crucial question as far as critical accounts of American hegemony and its 
potential impact on Southeast Asia is concerned, is how successfully the key 
components of US foreign policy in particular and the values associated with 
American interests more generally are accepted in the region. The evidence is mixed 
and contestable, varying across issue areas, and dependent on the level of analysis 
employed. To simplify a complex picture, therefore, it is useful to separate the 
political-economic impacts of American power from its more direct and overt 
strategic elements, and to consider elite level and broader societal responses. 
 
The political-economy of American power 
 
America’s pivotal position in the post-war international order has meant that it has 
inevitably shaped economic and, by extension, political outcomes across the region. 
Most obviously, this was manifest in the self-conscious attempt on America’s part to 
create an environment within which to nurture successful capitalist economies in 
Southeast Asia – a process in which the IFIs played a major role. While the World 
Bank and the IMF may have always been subjected to criticism from critics 
concerned about their close association with American interests and their possible 
negative impact on the course of development in the non-core economies (Woods 
1999), what is striking about the contemporary order is that the role of both 
institutions is seen to have fundamentally changed in ways that are often resented in 
Southeast Asia. At one level the evolving role of the IFIs is a function of systemic 
change in the global economy: the breakdown of the original Bretton Woods regime 
inevitably engendered significant institutional reinvention and ‘mission creep’.3 At 
another level, however, changes in the wider geo-political order, especially the ending 
of the Cold War and the increased importance of economic issues on the agendas of 
policymakers in the US, meant that the possibility for a less constrained application of 
American power was opened up (Buzan and Little 1999). 
 
Such a possibility was most graphically illustrated in the aftermath of the East Asian 
crisis when the US - and the IMF over which it continues to exercise great influence 
(Stiglitz 2002) – played an especially prominent role in post-crisis reform initiatives 
and management. The crisis and its impact on Southeast Asia have been the subject of 
extensive analysis elsewhere (see Robison et al 2000), so I shall not add to that 
extensive literature here. However, it is important to emphasise that the IFI’s 
reformist initiatives were mediated at an elite level, even if their impact was more 
widespread. While most attention focused on the economic aspects of the crisis, for 
the purposes of this discussion what is especially important are the political, social 
and ideational impacts of the crisis. The reason for this re-focusing is straightforward: 
if American hegemony is to maintain its more pervasive influence over regions like 
Southeast Asia, it is essential that the sorts of predominantly neoliberal reforms it 
champions enjoy widespread acceptance and some degree of legitimacy. Yet at both 
an elite and broader societal level there is clear evidence that there is broadly based, 
albeit muted, resentment about the impact of American power (Higgott 1998). 
 
No country was more badly affected by the original crisis than Indonesia (Beeson 
1998); no country more vividly illustrates the inherent tensions involved in trying to 
accommodate multiple - potentially incompatible - internal and external pressures. On 
the one hand, Indonesia’s political elites have had little choice other than to comply 
with the demands of the IFIs and the lenders they represent if they are to access the 
necessary funds to finance budget deficits (Greenlees 2003). On the other hand, 
however, not only have leading economic commentators like former finance minister 
Rizal Ramli made vitriolic criticisms of the IMF and its policies (BBC 2002), but 
Indonesia’s National Assembly has pressured current President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri to cut ties with the IMF because its prescriptions are widely considered 
‘unsuitable for this country’ (Kearney 2002). Somewhat surprisingly given the 
prominent role popular, student-led unrest played in accelerating the downfall of the 
Suharto regime, it is noteworthy that there has not been widespread and sustained 
opposition to globalisation generally or to the IFIs in particular. True, there have been 
the occasional ‘anti-globalisation’ demonstrations by disgruntled farmers and the like 
(Ahmad 2003), but what is most striking about the crisis-afflicted countries generally, 
as Stephan Haggard (2001: 71) points out, ‘is the absence – not the virulence – of 
backlash against globalisation’. As we shall see, where there has been large scale 
social mobilisation in opposition to unwanted external influences or pressures, it has 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the evolution and role of the Bretton Woods institutions, see Eichengreeen and 
Kenen (1994). 
taken the form of a religiously-inspired anti-war movement, rather rallying against the 
more diffuse forms of institutionalised hegemony. 
 
This story can be repeated across the region. In Thailand, for example, Kevin 
Hewison has detailed both the way in which ‘localists’ or anti-globalisation forces 
have mobilised in opposition to powerful external influences, and the inherent 
limitations of the putative movement itself: 
 
…there is no politically sound or viable economic alternative proffered by the localists. 
Thailand’s new populism has not wrenched itself free of the issues that have bedevilled 
populist policies everywhere: it is reactionary, romantic… anti-urban and encourages 
chauvinism (Hewison 2000: 292). 
 
So while prominent Southeast Asian intellectuals like Walden Bello (2003) may rail 
against the US’s ‘naked bid for hegemony’ and claim that there is a ‘burgeoning 
global movement against corporate-driven globalisation which has…fused with the 
anti-war movement to form a powerful anti-US front at the level of international civil 
society’, in much of Southeast Asia, at least, this looks more like wishful thinking 
than political reality. And yet it should come as no surprise, perhaps: a number of 
observers have noted the relatively underdeveloped nature of civil society generally 
and the political quiescence of the middle classes in particular across much of 
Southeast Asia (Rodan 1996; Camillleri 2000). Indeed, as Birdsall and Haggard 
(2000) point out, despite the negative impact of the crisis on the region’s growing 
middle classes, their inability to shape public policy revealed their ‘political 
impotence’ and the enduring power of indigenous business elites.  
 
Even in the Philippines, where there is a comparatively vibrant civil society, it has not 
had a major impact on the content of public policy or that country’s relations with 
either the US or the IFIs. On the contrary, not only have the US and the IFIs played a 
critical role in shaping the Philippines’ political and economic trajectory since 
independence (see Hutchcroft 1998), but as we shall see, despite the closure of the US 
bases in the Philippines, it remains closely aligned to the US militarily and an integral 
part of the ‘war on terror’ in Southeast Asia. Indeed, where there has been more 
effective opposition to the neoliberal agenda that has been so influential in the 
Philippines, it has come about as a consequence of domestic business opposition, 
rather than as a consequence of the efforts of civil society more generally (Ramos 
2003). 
 
Malaysia is, of course, the most prominent example of what Gramscian-inspired 
scholarship might describe as a ‘counter hegemonic discourse’ in Southeast Asia.4 
While there is no doubt that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed is 
closely associated with a withering critique of ‘the West’, the US, and the activities of 
the IFIs and Western multinationals (Stewart 1999), Mahathir’s ideas are frequently 
inconsistent, targeted as much at a domestic audience as they are at the objects of his 
criticism, and have had a limited impact – in the short-term at least. This is 
unfortunate because - despite the frequently self-serving nature of much of his 
rhetoric and a policy agenda that is designed to entrench the position of the political-
economic elite he represents and largely created (Beeson 2000) – his criticism of the 
contemporary international order is not without merit. The ‘late’ industrialising 
                                                 
4 For an interesting Gramscian-inspired reading of Malaysian development, see Hilley (2001). 
economies of Southeast Asia do face structurally embedded obstacles to development 
as a consequence of the dominance of both existent economic entities and the actions 
of the IFI’s in entrenching a transnational regulatory framework that favours the 
developed world (Beeson 2002). Yet despite the success of the Malaysian response to 
the East Asian crisis and the associated experiment with capital controls, the 
underlying political and economic reality is that Malaysia has abandoned its attempts 
to forge economic independence and willingly reintegrated itself into the international 
financial system (BBC 2001; Boyd 1999). 
 
Thus, despite Mahathir’s prominent place in debates about the course and content of 
globalisation and the impact of ‘the West’ on Southeast Asia, as far as economic 
policy is concerned there would seem to be little one country acting alone can 
accomplish. At the regional level, the potential looks greater, although there are 
formidable obstacles to creating an alternative to the contemporary international order 
that America dominates. This is especially so since September 11. But before 
considering the implications of recent events for inter-regional relations, it is 
important to say something about American strategic policy and its impact on 
Southeast Asia. 
 
The ‘war on terror’ and its impact on Southeast Asia 
 
 During the 1980s and even into the ’90s, the conventional wisdom had it that 
American hegemony was on the decline (Kennedy 1988), something that was 
considered to open up new possibilities for regime formation and regional 
development (Crone 1993). Now, however, the picture looks very different. Despite 
some very real and enduring doubts about the underlying strength of the American 
economy (Brenner 2002), on a range of crucial measures the US is clearly the 
dominant actor in the international system (The Economist 2002). That America has 
enduring sources of structural power is  important in itself, but what is of greatest 
significance as far as Southeast Asia is concerned is that the US is prepared to use its 
generally latent military - and to a lesser extent diplomatic- power to pursue what it 
perceives to be its national interest. While an extensive consideration of the evolving 
nature of American foreign policy is beyond the scope of this essay,5 it is worth 
making a few brief remarks about the Bush administration’s approach to the post-S11 
international order as it has direct implications for the Southeast Asian region. 
 
The first point to emphasise is just how assertive and - where deemed necessary - 
unilateral and militarised American policy has become. This new approach was most 
forthrightly stated in the US’s revised National Security Strategy (2002: 15), which 
claimed the right to act pre-emptively where a threat to American security was 
perceived. The US’s paramount position in the international system meant that this 
was necessarily a development with major implications for all other nations, friends 
and foes alike. However, given that the new doctrine also had a major ‘moral’ 
component and was explicitly linked to the fight against ‘evil’, the implications for 
countries that found themselves on the wrong side of this moral divide in the ‘war on 
terror’ were potentially as great as they had been for ideological opponents of 
America during the Cold War. Southeast Asia’s large Muslim populations, and the 
existence of Islamic insurgency movements in a number of countries (Chalk 2001), 
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meant that the region would inevitably feature prominently in American plans to 
combat international terrorism. America’s insistence that other states should declare 
for or against the US’s position made this an even more difficult problem for the 
governments of the region – despite the fact that some observers considered the actual 
threat to America posed by radical Islam in Southeast Asia to be seriously overstated 
(Gersham 2002). 
 
The second point to make, which has both pragmatic and theoretical implications, is 
that the relatively small coterie of advisors that exert such an influence on American 
foreign policy under the Bush administration are 
 
 “realists”  to the core, which…means they take an extremely unreal view of the rest of 
the world, and are insensitive to the point of autism when it comes to the character and 
motivations of others (Lieven 2002: 5).  
 
Even allowing for a degree of hyperbole on Lieven’s part, he has a point: plainly there 
has been a fundamental shift from the more multilateral, consultative approach of the 
Clinton era, to one in which American power is less constrained by either other 
countries or international institutions.6 Theoretically, this serves as something of a 
challenge to Gramscian perspectives that emphasise consent and ideological 
dominance: not only is there a powerful, anti-American, counter hegemonic discourse 
in much of the Islamic world, but the US is prepared to risk fracturing the existent 
ideological status quo through actions that are not dependent on broad international 
support and may in fact alienate allies and opponents alike (Bernstein 2003). 
Practically, the new American assertiveness leaves governments of Southeast Asia in 
particular caught between an implacable American unilateralism on the one hand, and 
increasingly radical and prominent Islamic movement on the other. While the impact 
of the US’s new strategic doctrine has not – for some of the region’s ruling elites, at 
least – been entirely negative,  it has done little for the region’s overall international 
reputation, especially at a time when the ASEAN region is already experiencing 
reduced inflows of foreign investment, a battered tourism sector and declining  export 
volumes (The Economist 2003). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the country that has suffered most from recent developments has been 
Indonesia. While the Indonesian military may have actually benefited from the ‘war 
on terror’ by securing a resumption of ties with, and funding from, the US (Donnan 
2003), elsewhere a virulent and widespread anti-Americanism has emerged across 
Indonesia, especially as a consequence of the US-led invasion of Iraq (Burrell 2003). 
Consequently, and despite the fact that Megawati’s government remains highly 
vulnerable to direct pressure from the US itself and the activities of the US-influenced 
IFIs, criticism of American policy has been surprisingly strident and consistent 
(Hartcher 2003). This is not, however, a unified regional position, nor representative 
of the wider Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Lee 2003). On the 
contrary, the ‘traditional’ ASEAN view about the supposed critical strategic 
importance of American power in maintaining regional stability still has powerful and 
prominent  advocates. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (2003), for 
                                                 
6 For an important and influential statement of the ‘neo-conservative’ strategic perspective that has 
proved so influential under the Bush administration, see Kagan et al (2000). Significantly, this report 
advocates a much greater projection of American power in general and for a more prominent presence 
in Southeast Asia in particular. 
example, argues that ‘whatever their public rhetoric, every Asian government 
understands the need for a good relationship with the US’.  
 
Elsewhere, the response to America’s evolving policy has been more complex and 
occasionally unpredictable. Malaysia’s Mahathir (2003) has of late characterised the 
American-led ‘war on terror’ as not just anti-Islamic, but part of a wider campaign by 
the rich, western nations for world domination. However, this position has emerged 
subsequent to an initial rapprochement between Malaysia and the US. Significantly, 
during the earlier phase of improved relations in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11, Mahathir took the opportunity to crack down on a range of political 
opponents – with the US’s blessing - under the guise of an anti-terrorism drive 
(Francis 2002). Similarly, in the Philippines, the administration of President Arroyo 
has attempted to improve its security relations with the US whilst simultaneously 
attempting to wipe out long-running indigenous insurgency movents (Hookway 
2002). However, as in other parts of the region, renewed military ties with the US and 
the latter’s active part in combating rebel groups in the Philippines prompted 
widespread demonstrations by nationalists concerned about the further erosion of 
Philippine sovereignty (Cheeseman 2003). Even Thailand is coming under pressure to 
align itself with American policy – an outcome that is rendered more likely by the US 
suggesting that Thailand’s desire for a bilateral free trade pact is dependent on 
security cooperation (Crispin 2003). 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the ‘war on terror’ in particular and the US’s 
efforts to play a more direct role in combating perceived threats to its own security in 
general reveal the strengths and weakness of American power. On the one hand, the 
US clearly has the capacity to place enormous pressure on less powerful states across 
the world to act in ways that suit its own national preoccupations. On the other, such 
actions have created a widespread backlash against what is frequently seen as an 
arrogant and insensitive form of American unilateralism – a development that 
fundamentally undermines the possibility of establishing a more broadly-based, 
consensual, hegemonic ideology. American actions in particular and the rising global 
concern with security more generally have, in fact, had the effect of actually 
constraining the development of a more independent civil society and political 
liberalisation across the region. In this regard, it is striking that many of the leaders of 
radical Islam across Southeast Asia have emerged from the ranks of the educated, 
urban ‘middle class’ (Jones 2003). In other words, the transition to liberal democracy 
some claim is an inevitable corollary of economic development and globalisation, and 
which might be expected to play a critical role in underpinning and legitimating 
American hegemony, is being undercut as the nature of that hegemony is transformed. 
Indeed, James Kurth forcefully draws out the potential implications of this point when 
he claims that: 
 
The simultaneous occurrence of the ascendancy of the American global empire and the 
ascendancy of the Islamic terrorist threat is not just an irony: a dialectical or symbiotic 
causal connection exists between the imperial and the terrorist ascendancies. (Kurth 
2002: 404). 
 
The US and Asian Regionalism 
 
It has become increasingly commonplace to describe America’s contemporary global 
role as ‘imperial’, and not just by critical theorists (see Bacevich 2002). On the 
contrary, some observers, including key players in and around the administration of 
George W. Bush, argue that the US ought to play a more assertive international role.7 
However the US’s position is described, it is clear that since the Second World War 
the US has been the principal architect and hegemonic mainstay of an international 
order that has come to be subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalisation’.8 The critical 
questions now are whether the legitimacy and nature of the larger global project will 
be transformed by recent events and how this will impact upon other parts of the 
world like East Asia. In this final section, I briefly consider the possible impact of 
America’s evolving global role on regional relations within East Asia itself, and 
between the region and the US. 
 
Recent events have not only forced us to reconsider the nature and application of 
American power, but they have also encouraged a concomitant reassessment of 
America’s relationship with key regions like East Asia and Europe (see respectively, 
Beeson and Berger 2003; Kagan 2003). As a number of observers have noted, global 
processes are mediated by regional factors in crucial ways that effect everything from 
economic competitiveness to national security (Larner and Walters, 2002). As far as 
the countries of Southeast Asia are concerned they are constrained by their position in 
both the overarching, US-dominated global system and by the wider East Asian 
regional orders order of which they are a crucial, albeit somewhat subordinate, part. 
As Katzenstein (2000) notes, in the post-war period, Japan and - more recently - 
China have been the key countries in shaping the East Asian region; the future 
development of any region-wide order will inevitably be largely determined by their 
actions or, in the case of Japan, inactions. While it is not possible consider the 
dynamics of East Asian regionalism in great detail here,9 it is important to note a 
number of key factors that will influence relations between the US and Southeast 
Asia.  
 
First, it is important to stress that it is not possible to understand the position and 
prospects of the less powerful Southeast Asian countries without placing them in a 
wider East Asian context. Not only has the development of indigenous Southeast 
Asian regional institutions like ASEAN been shaped by the strategic manoeuvrings of 
the US and China in particular, but Japan has been a pivotal economic influence on 
Southeast Asia’s economic development (see, respectively, Henderson 1999; Beeson 
2001). However, Japan’s historically influential role is being undermined both by its 
own economic problems, and by a noteworthy increase in US FDI in East Asia 
generally, both in absolute terms, but especially in comparison to Japan (Hsiao et al 
2003). The US’s growing economic importance is further reinforced at the strategic 
level, where ASEAN’s highly distinctive modus operandi – the ‘ASEAN way’ – of 
consensus, non-interference and the protection of national sovereignty has come 
under increased pressure. This was true even before S11 (see Acharya 2001), but US 
intervention in the region has made the ASEAN way less tenable. Importantly, it has 
not only been America’s strategic interventions that have undermined ASEAN 
autonomy and solidarity: as we have seen, the East Asian financial crisis was a pivotal 
                                                 
7 See Kagan et al (2002); Lind (2003). 
8 See Held et al (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of the multifaceted nature of the processes 
associated with globalisation. 
9 For a fuller discussion see Beeson (2003b). 
event that both undermined the credibility of East Asia’s distinctive developmental 
strategies and allowed the external forces to exert powerful reformist pressures on the 
vulnerable countries of the region. Even though such interventions were widely 
resented at both an elite and a broader societal level, the Southeast Asian countries in 
particular had a limited capacity to respond. 
 
The second major point to make, then, is that individual Southeast Asian nations 
simply cannot hope to resist effectively American hegemony and the reformist 
pressures of the IFIs it influences, no matter how great the pressures from ‘below’ 
may be. However, in conjunction with a the greater economic power and potential 
political presence of their larger Northeast Asian neighbours, they might. The East 
Asian crisis and its aftermath dramatically brought home to East Asia’s ruling elites 
just how vulnerable they were to economic forces they could not effectively control, 
and political pressures they could not easily resist. It is this recognition and the desire 
to defend the region against powerful processes associated with globalisation that 
largely underpins the development of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping, which 
in addition to the original ASEAN countries includes Japan, Chian and South Korea. 
While APT has, as yet, achieved little tangible, but its goal – and potential capacity – 
of establishing a regional monetary regime to insulate itself from future crises and to 
provide greater policy autonomy for the governments of the region is indicative of a 
widespread regional desire to mediate external influences and control the impact of 
global market forces (Dieter and Higgott 2002). 
 
The final point to make about the region-wide political initiatives of which the 
Southeast Asian nations are a part, therefore, is that it is essentially a reactive process 
that is being driven as much by American hegemony and globalisation as it is by any 
exclusively indigenous dynamic (Beeson 2003b). The fact that this process of regional 
political cooperation has gained most momentum in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis is especially revealing. And yet it is also important to recognise that its 
prospects are also likely to be constrained by external forces: Japan’s continuing 
subordination to the US, and China’s preoccupation with successful integration into a 
global capitalist economy dominated by the US, limit the potential for autonomous, 
coordinated regional policy (Beeson and Berger 2003).10 Southeast’s prospects remain 
largely contingent on the actions of these major powers. 
 
Revealingly, this truncated analysis of East Asian regionalism has focused almost 
entirely on the actions of states and the political elites that govern them. In a region 
that is still associated with authoritarian rule and state-led development, this is, 
perhaps, unsurprising. Indeed, in much of East Asia civil society of any sort is not 
well developed, let alone the sort of global civil society that some observers see as a 
corollary of economic integration across national borders (Mathews 1997). However, 
this does not mean that there are not pressures from below that are developing in 
opposition to processes of globalisation generally and to American hegemony in 
particular. The dramatic impact of the East Asian crisis that culminated in regime 
change in Indonesia and Thailand reminded local elites of the importance of at least 
paying lip-service to the interests of the victims of global structural adjustment. What 
is most striking in East Asia – especially following the conflict in Iraq – is how much 
                                                 
10 It is also important to note the potentially negative impact that China’s and Japan’s competing  
regional leadership ambitions may have on East Asian co-operation and solidarity. 
political activism is channelled into increasingly prominent Islamic movements, and 
how much resentment is directed toward the US. In Indonesia, for example, which is 
both the most strategically important and populous Muslim country in Southeast Asia, 
favourable opinions about America have dropped from 61% to 15% in the space of a 
year (Pew Research Centre 2003).  
 
In such circumstances, even if regional elites feel they have limited scope to oppose 
US policy, this does not mean that American hegemony enjoys the sort of broadly 
based, institutionalised and legitimated support that liberal theorists like John 
Ikenberry (2001) claim was such an integral feature of the Bretton Woods era. If 
critical theories of hegemony are correct in arguing that for hegemony to be sustained 
and effective it must ‘naturalise’ or at least legitimate the prevailing ideological order, 
then it would seem for all the US’s overweening power there are plainly limits to its 
influence, and possibly even limits to the longevity of American hegemony – at least 
in the form it has primarily assumed at the centre of the post-war international order.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
American power and attitudes toward it have undergone significant change. The 
nature of US hegemony has changed from the highly institutionalised, multilateral 
order associated with globalisation and the integration of political and economic 
activities, to one that is more unilateral and reliant on ‘hard’ military power rather 
than ‘soft’ ideological power (see Nye 2002). More straightforwardly, we might say 
that American power is becoming less consensual and more coercive. As we have 
seen, however, not only is the application of more direct, coercive power not 
guaranteed of success and frequently widely resented, but it necessarily engenders 
higher ‘transaction costs’. The great advantage of the old order was that it provided 
clear pay-offs for allies and client states; indeed, the rise of East Asia cannot be 
understood without reference to the positive – if generally unforseen and uneven – 
impact of American hegemony (Ozawa 2003). While there may still be broad support 
for American hegemony amongst Southeast Asia’s political elites, concerned as they 
are about the destabilising strategic impact of American military withdrawal and the 
destructive economic impact of reduced market access, American power is no longer 
as widely accepted as it once was. On the contrary, as Fareed Zakaria (2002: 81) 
observes, under the present Bush administration it is entirely possible that ‘anti-
Americanism will become the global language of protest – the default ideology of 
opposition- unifying the world’s malcontents’. 
 
The economic devastation wrought by the East Asian crisis, the widely resented 
American-led reform efforts that followed in its wake, and the more recent efforts to 
curb radical Islam have all served to engender hostility toward the US in Southeast 
Asia. However, even in Indonesia, this resentment has been contained and has not led 
to a rupture in relations. On the contrary, there are emerging parallels between the 
‘war on terror’ and the Cold War as American power reinforces the position of 
regional militaries and authoritarian leaders. Paradoxically enough, therefore, despite 
the fragile and dependent nature of the economic recovery across much of the region 
and the fact that political development was actively suppressed during much of the 
Cold War, the immediate prospects for either progressive social development or the 
reconsolidation of American hegemony appear dim. 
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